Constitutional judiciary and Democracy (Formation and restrictions of work)

Section: RESEARCH
Issue
Vol. 27 No. 91 (2025): Volume 27 Issue 91
Published
Aug 4, 2025
Pages
493-534

Abstract

The system of governance that depends on democracy has several pillars, including the existence of a constitution that affirms the supremacy of law and the principle of separation of powers. This principle contributes to the establishment of a state of institutions, in which the constitutional judiciary serves as a cornerstone. This central role is attributed to the constitutional judiciary due to the supervisory functions it performs, which significantly influence the state and are entrusted to it under the constitution. However, several factors affect the scope of judicial independence and the effectiveness of constitutional oversight. Among the most important are the mechanisms of its formation, how its members are selected, the extent to which public authorities accept its role, as well as the rules it follows and the procedures for issuing rulings.

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Authors

Tofiq Bajalan

Al hamdaniya University

ORCID
Dowlat Al-brefkany

Mosul university

ORCID

Identifiers

https://doi.org/10.33899/arlj.2022.134602.1209
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